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Costs, Competition and the Prime 
Regular readers of  the financial press may 
have noted a growing divergence in the way 
the media treatthe news about changes in the 
banks' prime business-loan rate. Most editors 
still give the prime a prominent place on the 
financial pages-"above the fold"  -;-along 
with news about the stock averages, the 
money supply, and the price of gold. Others, 
however, are beginning to question the 
newsworthiness of  the prime, arguing that it is 
no longer a usefu I barometer of  the price of 
credit. 
This questioning of  the value of  the prime 
reflects the growing tendency by banks to 
lend below the prime-in effect, discounting 
that rate. This behavior appears to violate the 
classic definition of  the prime as the rate 
available only to borrowers with the very best 
credit credentials. Actual loan rates 
supposedly are always scaled upward from 
the prime, depending upon the risks of  the 
loan or creditworthiness of the borrower. 
In the words of one somewhat jaded banker, 
"Everybody worries about the prime rate, but 
few people pay it." Or in the words of 
another, paraphrasing Humpty Dumpty, 
"The pri  me rate means just what  we want it  to 
mean." Despite all such disavowals, changes 
in the prime are importantto financial-market 
participants fortheir "announcementeffect." 
The prime may not be an infallible guide to 
the direction of interest rates, but it remains a 
highly visible and reasonably representative 
indicator of  changes in the general cost of 
bank borrowing. Consequently, we would 
profit from a review of the cost and com-
petitive factors that determine this key rate. 
Nature of the prime 
Many people mistakenly believe that the 
Federal Reserve sets the banks' prime rate. 
(See our Weekly Letter of February 20, 1981.) 
Despite its strong impact on credit markets, 
the Federal Reserve certainly does not have 
"hands on" control of the prime. The Fed 
influences the environment in which that key 
rate is determined by controlling the rate of 
growth of money and bank credit. If actual 
money-supply growth diverges from the 
Fed's money targets, market participants tend 
to change their expectations regarding the 
future course of money growth, inflation and 
interest rates. Nonetheless, market forces of 
supply and demand for credit accommoda-
tion remain the key determinants of  the level 
of money-market rates. 
The prime rate itself, while quite sensitive to 
changes in the money market, ,is not deter-
mined directly by market forces. Rather, it is 
an administered rate-that is, determined by 
individual banks. On occasion, major com-
mercial banks have linked their prime rates 
by formu la to some market rate, such as the 
market for commercial paper or large-
denomination certificates of deposit (CDs). A 
typical formula might include a spread of 
about 1  Y2 percentage points over the average 
cost of commercial paper in the several 
preceding weeks, which would mean a 
pri  me of 18112 percent at the recent 
commercial-paper rate of 17 percent. 
This method of setting the prime has lost 
popularity inthe last several years because of 
the increased variability of market rates, and 
the banks that used that approach have 
reverted to setting the prime by administra-
tive decision. Yet the prime is not immune 
from the forces of  the market, despite the 
discretionary manner in which it is generally 
set. Banks set the prime to equalize the 
demand for credit with the supply of avail-
able funds, so that it represents the price 
which banks perceive will clear the market. 
Costs and competition 
In their rate-setting decisions, bankers pay 
close attention to the market quotes for large 
certificates of deposit (CDs), which are an 
important source of funds to banks when 
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tions. CDs have gained in importance in 
recent years, as banks suffered outflows of 
"core" deposits-demand deposits and 
low-cost savings accounts. But banks of 
course can "manage" their CD liabilities by 
their own rate decisions; for example, when 
loan demand is slack and a bank has ample 
fu nds, it can post a CD rate lower than the 
prevailing market rate to indicate its lack of 
interest in attracting more funds. 
Competitive factors, as well as costs, affect 
banks' rate-setting decisions. Major corpora-
tions with the highest credit ratings don't 
have to borrow from banks, but instead can 
issue their own IOUs in the highly-organized 
commercial-paper market. The commercial-
paper rate currently is running about three 
percentage points below the prevailing 
prime. Not surprisingly, then, outstanding 
nonfinancial commercial paper has doubled 
since the end of 1978, in contrast to a 12-
percent rise in domestic banks' outstanding 
commercial loans over the same period. 
Foreign banks also have come to playa major 
role in this competition for corporate busi-
ness, and now account for about one-sixth of 
all business loans-considerably more in the 
key New York and California markets. These 
banks, despite growing restrictions on their 
U.S. activities, can channel low-cost funds 
from abroad to U.S. business borrowers. The 
key rate in this competition is the LlBOR 
(London Interbank Offer Rate), which has 
been running at least three percentage points 
below the prevailing prime. (LiBOR is not 
clearly analogous to the prime rate because it 
is generally quoted on a maturity basis; for 
example, the one-to-six month cost of Euro-
dollar balances.) In any event, the availability 
of low-cost commercial paper and foreign 
loans has forced domestic banks to reduce 
the price of credit to the very best of  their 
2 
"best" customers. It should be noted, how-
ever,  that  most  banks  have  offered  below-
prime rates only on very short-term loans. 
Recent rate trends 
The prime rate has fluctuated substantially in 
recent years, along with those rates that 
bankers watch when setting the prime (see 
chart). During  the first half  of 1979, the prime 
rate remained steady at 11 % percent, while 
the commercial-paper and CD rates ranged 
around 10 percent or a little lower. 
(Commercial-paper and CD rates generally 
move closely together, because they 
represent alternative short-term investments 
to the average investor.) Market rates rose 
sharply after mid-1979, reflecting rising 
inflation rates and investors' expectations of 
worse to come. As those rates rose, banks 
began to boost the prime, until it reached 20 
percent in April 1980. 
The short but sharp business downturn in the 
spring months reduced market rates by half 
within a month's time. Tight credit controls, 
plus recession-influenced rate expectations, 
pushed market rates down during this period 
-and pushed the prime down in their wake. 
But rates recovered sharply with the second-
half 1980 business recovery -and  they have 
remained high (although sharply fluctuating) 
so far this year because of a tighter monetary 
policy, shifting credit demands, and a stand-
off between decelerating price indexes and 
fears of a future resurgence of inflation. 
The prime rate, while not directly market-
determined, certainly responds to the same 
factors that act upon market rates. This helps 
explain both the stratospheric level of  the 
quoted prime rate and the pressures forcing a 
discounting of  that rate. On the one hand, 
banks now rely heavily upon deposits or 
liabilities that they obtain in the money mar-ket, for whiCh they must pay the going market 
rates. On the other hand, banks must respond 
to the competition for business financing, 
whether arising from the commercial-paper 
market or from foreign sources. 
The prime rate thus has become more 
responsive to market pressures over time, 
such as market participants' expectations 
regarding the trend of inflation and interest 
rates. When market participants fores~ 
a decline in the inflation rate, money-market 
rates will begin to decline. Ahd since market 
rates represent banks' marginal cosj of  funds, 
the prime rate at that point will also begin 
to decline. 
Herbert Runyon 
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6/17/81  Dollar  Percent 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) -'-total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-)  . 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 




















631  13,273  9.7 
750  13,068  11.3 
477  4,924  14.7 
84  5,907  12.6 
50  - 870  3.6 
52  699  74.0 
85  12  0.2 
- 34  197  1.3 
-1,000  1,613  - 3.9 
166  - 2,480  - 8.1 
- 309  2,149  7.8 
1,137  17,525  27.5 
1,254  17,428  31.8 
1,341  9,352  41.2 
Weekended  Comparable 
6/17/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  55 
135  1 
n.a.  56 
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